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Abstract 
 
The recent financial crisis has clearly shown that the relationship between bank internationalization 
and risk is complex. Multinational banks can benefit from portfolio diversification, reducing their 
overall riskiness, but this effect can be offset by incentives going in the opposite direction, leading 
them to take on excessive risks. Since both effects are grounded on solid theoretical arguments, the 
answer of what is the actual relationship between bank internationalization and risk is left to the 
empirical analysis. In this paper, we study such relationship in the period leading to the financial 
crisis of 2007-2008. For a sample of 384 listed banks from 56 countries, we calculate two measures 
of risk for the period from 2001 to 2007 – the expected default frequency (EDF), a market-based 
and forward-looking indicator, and the Z-score, a balance-sheet-based and backward-looking 
measure – and relate them to their degree of internationalization. We find robust evidence that 
international diversification increases bank risk. 
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Introduction 
Scholars have traditionally viewed bank internationalization more favorably than 
regulators and policymakers, on the grounds that opening the banking market to foreign 
players will result in larger economies of scope and scale, increased competition, and 
better risk diversification. However, recent research has confirmed part of the fears of 
policymakers, showing that bank internationalization may induce multinational players 
to hinder the development of local banks, cherry-pick the best clientele and bypass 
local regulations. 
At first sight, one may classify this debate as a standard discussion between those 
in favor of free markets and those who believe that certain economic sectors, such as 
the financial markets, need to be strictly regulated. But the recent financial crisis has 
clearly shown that market forces, especially in the financial sector, are not always 
capable of driving the economic system to the first best equilibrium. The call for 
stricter regulation of financial activities has been strong, with particular attention being 
paid to the role of the so-called systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). 
Many scholars have argued that SIFIs consist exclusively of large multinational banks. 
A key issue that has emerged during the recent financial crisis is that 
multinational banks are too risky. Their default is likely to generate substantial 
spillover effects to the rest of the system, because they are large and operate in many 
different countries. Additionally, their complex corporate structures may trigger 
perverse incentives and excessive risk-taking behavior. The emerging view is indeed 
that the higher complexity and excessive agency problems associated with 
multinational banks outweigh the benefits of diversifying the idiosyncratic risks. But 
since both of these theses are grounded on solid theoretical arguments, we believe that 
whether multinational banks are more or less risky than domestic institutions is 
ultimately an empirical issue. 
 While a vast number of studies have analyzed the determinants of bank risk 
taking (Vander Vennet et al., 2002; Boyd et al., 2006), the relationship between 
international diversification and individual bank risk-taking behavior has received much 
less attention, and most analyses focus only on the U.S. market. In this paper, we 
analyze this important but overlooked issue by studying the relationship between 
international diversification and risk in a sample of 384 listed banks headquartered in 56 
different countries around the world. Our sample includes both internationally 
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diversified and purely domestic banks. We cover the 7 years before the financial crisis, 
a period during which the riskiness of banks and financial markets increased 
substantially. This risk-taking behavior eventually led to the worst collapse since the 
Great Depression. To measure the riskiness of multinational banks, we follow the 
modified “chop-shop” approach proposed by Laeven and Levine (2007). In this 
approach, each bank’s excess risk is calculated as the difference between its actual risk 
and the imputed risk level that it would have if its domestic and foreign activities were 
“chopped” into two parts. With regard to the risk measures, we consider indices that are 
widely used in the literature: the expected default frequency (EDF), a market-based and 
forward-looking measure, and the Z-score, a backward-looking measure based on 
balance-sheet information. 
Our work is related to two major streams of the literature. First, we contribute to 
the analysis of the determinants of bank risk taking by considering a specific type of 
corporate structure, the multinational company, which is most likely to be affected by 
all of the problems that standard agency theories have shown to be major causes of 
corporate risk taking (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; John et al., 2008). Second, we 
contribute more specifically to the literature analyzing the characteristics of 
international banks (Buch and DeLong, 2009; Pozzolo, 2009). 
Our results show that internationally diversified banks are significantly riskier 
than domestically oriented banks. Thus, the positive effects of loan and asset 
diversification in reducing bank risk are outweighed by the negative effects caused by 
the perverse incentives and complexity associated with large multinational 
corporations. Our findings are confirmed adopting different estimation techniques and 
controlling for potential endogeneity. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates our research to the 
previous literature on bank risk taking. Section 3 describes our empirical strategy. 
Section 4 presents the sources of our information and describes the measures of risk 
and geographic diversification used in the empirical analyses. Section 5 presents the 
results. Section 6 concludes this paper. 
2. Related Literature 
The benefits from the diversification of idiosyncratic risks are among the best 
understood concepts in the economic literature (Cochrane, 2001). From this 
perspective, the geographic diversification of banks should dampen the effects of 
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idiosyncratic shocks and, in this way, reduce their overall riskiness. Although the 
potential gains from international portfolio diversification are still an object of current 
research in the finance literature,
1
 Buch et al. (2010) recently showed that bank asset 
portfolios exhibit a significant home bias. According to this view, geographic 
diversification should reduce aggregate bank risk.  
However, multinational banks typically have access to a much larger set of 
strategies to increase their risky activities than domestic banks. Additionally, these 
activities may be hidden from the view of local regulators. Incentive problems lie at the 
root of these choices. Although international diversification may prove to be a 
suboptimal decision once one accounts for the costs of increased management 
complexity, insiders may still support the acquisition of foreign participations if in this 
way they can obtain private benefits (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). For 
example, the increased asset liquidity associated with international operations might 
provide bank managers with more possibilities to trade against the bank’s interest 
(Myers and Rajan, 1998). In this case, geographic diversification may cause an increase 
in bank risk. In fact, the relevance of incentive issues in bank risk taking was confirmed 
in a recent study by Laeven and Levine (2009), who show that control problems have a 
first-order impact on corporate decisions and that banks with less dispersed 
shareholders are generally riskier.  
As we argued above, determining the net effect of the pros and cons of 
diversification is mainly an empirical issue. However, also in this case the results are 
rather mixed. Some studies show that geographic diversification increases bank risk. 
Hughes et al. (1996), studying the effects of U.S. branching deregulation, showed that 
an increase in the number of U.S. States in which a bank holding company operates 
increased insolvency risk, whereas a rise in the number of branches per se had the 
opposite effect. De Nicolò et al. (2004) found that large conglomerate corporations did 
not exhibit higher levels of risk-taking behavior than average banks in 1995, but did so 
in 2000. Other studies reached the opposite conclusion. Analyzing US mergers and 
acquisitions, Zhang (1995) found that geographical diversification leads to lower risk 
by reducing income variability. Deng et al. (2007) showed that banks that are 
domestically diversified on both the assets and the liabilities sides pay lower bond 
spreads, which provide indirect evidence of lower risk. Similarly, Deng and Elyasiani 
                                                 
1
 See Karolyi and Stulz (2001) and Stiroh (2009) for a survey of this literature. 
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(2008) found that geographically diversified banks have lower stock price variability. 
With regard to international diversification, Amihud et al. (2002) showed that cross-
border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have no effects on bidders’ systematic risk 
levels, although this result was questioned by Focarelli et al. (2008), who found instead 
that bidders experience a reduction in their beta (i.e., the correlation of their returns 
with stock market returns).
2
 
3. Empirical strategy 
3.1. Econometric model 
Our test of whether a bank’s excess risk is a function of its degree of international 
diversification is based on the following empirical model: 
                       Excess riskjt  = α +  geo divjt +  controlsjt + εjt,                           (1) 
where the measures of excess risk and geographic diversification refer to bank j at time 
t; the controls include time-varying bank-specific characteristics as well as time and 
country dummies; and εjt is an error term. To account for the large values of the 
coefficients of skewness and courtosis of our dependent variables, we trim our data by 
excluding observations below the 5
th
 percentile and above the 95
th
 percentile, and we 
estimate the model with standard OLS, robust regression techniques, that give lower 
weigh to outliers (Li, 1985), and quantile regressions evaluated at the median, that 
identify the regression plane minimizing the sum of the absolute residuals (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2009). In robustness tests we use alternative econometric specifications 
and alternative measures of bank risk and geographic diversification. In the following, 
we discuss in detail our measures of excess risk taking and geographic diversification 
as well as the controls introduced in our empirical model. 
3.2. Measures of excess risk 
For each bank j, we measure excess risk by comparing the bank’s actual risk with the 
imputed measure that it would have if it were “chopped” into two banks: a 
geographically diversified bank and a domestic, undiversified bank. If we could 
measure the actual risk of the geographically diversified bank (riskint) and the domestic 
                                                 
2
 Our research is also related to the analyses of the risk effects of the diversification of banking activities: 
Baele et al. (2007) show that a larger share of noninterest income is associated with higher systematic 
risk, which is measured by the market beta, and Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) also confirm this 
result with regard to the Z-score. 
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bank (riskdom), then the imputed risk of a bank with a share  of internationally 
diversified activities and a share (1 – ) of domestic activities would be φ riskint + (1 – 
φ) riskdom. Because we cannot precisely measure the risk of the geographically 
diversified and the domestic arms of the banks, for each bank j, we compute an index of 
foreign geographical dispersion as follows: first we define the diversity index    
 
  
    
, where nj  is the average number of foreign countries in which bank j has a 
subsidiary during our sample period, and nmax measures the same number for the most 
internationally diversified bank; then we calculate the excess risk of a geographically 
diversified bank as the difference between its actual risk and the weighted average value 
of the risk levels of banks with αj above a given threshold (riskint) and the risk levels of 
a domestic bank (riskdom), where the weight itself is determined by the bank’s degree of 
international diversification αj. Formally, we define excess risk as follows:  
       
Excess riskj = riskj – [αj riskint + (1 – αj) riskdom]                           (2) 
Similar to Laeven and Levine (2007), we define diversified banks as those banks that 
have an index of geographical dispersion above a threshold of 70% in our baseline 
specification. Domestic banks are those with an index of geographical dispersion below 
a threshold of 30%. 
 The empirical literature has proposed a large number of measures of bank risk 
taking.
3
 In our analysis, we use a market-based and forward-looking index, the 
expected default frequency (EDF) based on Black and Sholes (1973) and Merton 
(1974), and an accounting and backward-looking indicator, the Z-score. 
 More precisely, our first measure, the expected default frequency, is the bank’s 
5-year ahead cumulative EDF provided by Moody’s KMV, which is based on the 
Vasicek-Kealhofer model, as explained in detail by Kealhofer (2003). Following 
Laeven and Levine (2009), our second measure, the Z-score, is computed as 
, where CAR is the capital-to-total-assets ratio, EQT is the equity-to-total-
assets ratio, and σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of the return on assets (ROA) in the 
previous 3 years. Under the assumption that profits follow a normal distribution, the Z-
score measures the number of standard deviations that a bank’s ROA has to drop below 
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  For example, see Berger and De Young (1997), Williams (2004), Garlappi et al. (2006), De Nicolò and 
Loukoianova (2007), Laeven and Levine (2009), Altunbas et al. (2010), Buch and DeLong (2009), 
Chiaramonte and Casu (2010), Fiordelisi et al. (2010) and De Haan and Poghosyan (2011). 
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its expected value before the equity is entirely depleted. Because the Z-score is a 
negative function of the risk of default (i.e., banks with a higher Z-score are less likely 
to default), in our estimates we use the opposite of the Z-score, which we call Z-score, 
so that a positive sign of its coefficient implies an increase in bank risk, similar to the 
measure based on EDF. 
3.3. Measures of geographic diversification 
Most conventional empirical studies measure geographic diversification by considering 
the number of subsidiaries in a corporation or the number of locations in which the 
corporation is present. Some studies simply use a binary variable indicating whether the 
corporation is present in a given area (i.e., typically a foreign country). However, these 
measures do not precisely assess the level and the intensity of banks’ geographic 
diversification and do not account for the trend in international diversification that 
characterized the banking sector before the recent crisis (Pozzolo, 2009). Therefore, 
following Gulamhussen et al. (2010), we compute three alternative measures of 
geographic diversification. Each measure positions the banks over a continuum, with 
the lower bound corresponding to purely non-diversified (domestic) banks and the 
upper bound corresponding to the most geographically diversified banks. 
Our first measure is a proxy for geographic reach and is formally defined as 
follows: 
 geographic reachjt =  
    
      
 , (3) 
where nj,t  is the number of foreign countries in which the bank j has a subsidiary in year 
t, and nmax,t is the maximum number of foreign countries in which the most diversified 
bank has subsidiaries in year t. Clearly, geographic reach is a stock variable, 
continuous, and bounded between 0 and 1. Purely domestic banks assume a value of 0, 
and values close to 1 indicate more geographically dispersed banks. This index 
normalizes the measure of geographic diversification by accounting for the yearly 
variation of the most diversified banks.  
Our second measure, geographic share, computes the share of assets on a 
country-by-country basis by considering a bank’s asset dispersion across its 
subsidiaries (similar to Buch and Lipponer, 2007). We compute the difference between 
the total assets and the foreign assets of the bank’s subsidiaries. We then scale this 
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difference by the total assets of all bank’s subsidiaries. Formally, we calculate the 
following index: 
 geographic sharejt =    (
                                                     
                         
) . (4) 
Geographic share is also bounded between 0 and 1, with values close to 0 indicating 
low geographic diversification and values close to 1 indicating high geographic 
diversification.  
Compared with geographic reach, geographic share conveys more information, 
in that it considers the incidence of foreign participations in the aggregate activities of a 
banking group. In fact, the geographic reach of a bank that has 4 foreign subsidiaries, 
each of which accounts for just 2% of its total assets, is identical to that of a group that 
spreads its activities equally across different countries and that has 5 subsidiaries, each 
of which represents 20% of the total assets; on the contrary,  the geographic share of 
the two banks is, respectively, 0.08 and 0.80. However, geographic share has the 
drawback that a bank with just one foreign subsidiary that represents 50% of its 
activities is identical to a bank with foreign subsidiaries in 10 different countries, each 
of which represents 5% of this bank’s total assets.  
To account for both the number of foreign countries in which a bank is present 
and the weight of each activity, we calculated our third measure of diversification, 
geographic concentration, as a transformed Hirsch-Herfindhal Index (Mercieca et al., 
2007). We compute this index based on the total assets of a banking group’s foreign 
participations in each subsidiary in the various foreign countries.
4
 Formally, we define 
the index as follows: 
 geographic concentrationjt =    ∑ (
                  
                         
)
   
    . (5) 
Geographic concentration is also bounded between 0 and 1, with values close to 0 
indicating low geographic diversification and values close to 1 indicating 
geographically dispersed banks. 
3.4.  Other bank characteristics 
Bank riskiness is related to other characteristics than just international diversification. 
For example, during the recent financial crisis, scholars have forcefully argued that 
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 Similar concentration measures can be found in the works of Acharya et al. (2006) and Stiroh and 
Rumble (2006). 
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large banks have excessively high risk attitudes because they discount the fact that, in 
cases of distress, the government will bail them out using public money (i.e., they are 
too big to fail). At the same time, it is well known that larger banks are more likely to 
be internationally diversified. Because we are interested in measuring only the partial 
correlation between geographic diversification and risk, neglecting to control for size 
might introduce a bias in favor of finding a positive relationship just because larger 
banks are riskier and more international at the same time. To account for these and 
other bank characteristics that might potentially bias our results, we include a number 
of time varying bank-specific controls in our specification. 
First, we considered two measures related to size: the logarithm of total assets 
and that of total operating income. In addition to the too-big-to-fail argument, the asset 
and loan portfolios and the activities of larger banks are typically far more diversified 
than those of smaller institutions. This difference obviously impacts the degree of risk 
that banks take on, independently of their degree of international diversification. In 
addition, we also include total income, because it measures bank size taking indirectly 
into account also the role of off-balance sheet activities. Profitability is also correlated 
with both international diversification and risk: according to the standard mean-
variance portfolio model, higher profitability entails higher variability (i.e., higher risk) 
and, at the same time, it is well known that more profitable banks are more likely to be 
internationally diversified (Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2001). Moreover, a bank with a high 
franchise value might be less prone to engaging in risky activities because of the larger 
losses that it would incur in case of a default. To control for both profitability and 
franchise value, we therefore include the value of the returns on assets (ROA). In 
addition, we control for the share of retail deposits over total liabilities, because the 
funding composition is likely to affect the banks’ lending and investing strategies. 
Finally, since more capitalized banks can tap into riskier projects, we include in our 
specification the ratio of equity over total assets. 
3.5.  Country controls 
Country characteristics, such as the strictness of the regulatory environment, are most 
likely to have a strong impact on bank strategies and risk. To control for these possibly 
confounding effects on the relationship between internationalization and risk, we 
include country dummies in all our specifications.  
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4. Data and summary statistics 
4.1. Sources  
We focus on commercial banks, a homogeneous group of financial institutions that has 
been found to have compelling reasons to internationalize their activities (Focarelli and 
Pozzolo, 2005; Barba et al., 2010). To assemble our data, we first extracted the yearly 
account and market data from 2001-2007 on all of the listed commercial banks on 
Bankscope with total assets in excess of US$ 100 million. We excluded smaller banks, 
that may face additional challenges and costs in diversifying across borders compared 
with large banks. We also excluded banks headquartered in off-shore centers, such as 
Bermuda, Gibraltar, the Virgin Islands or the Cayman Islands, because they typically 
have less standard business models. We retrieved some missing information from 
Worldscope, Datastream and individual bank websites, integrating in this way our 
initial data set. We undertook a painstaking effort to clean and complement the 
information downloaded from Bankscope and to avoid incongruent and missing data on 
crucial account and market variables. Our data-assembling exercise yielded an initial 
sample of 577 commercial banks and 4,039 bank-year observations.  
By matching our initial 577 publicly traded banks with the yearly data on the 
banks’ subsidiaries, we obtained a final sample of 384 banks headquartered in 56 
countries for which time-varying data on domestic and foreign subsidiaries were 
available.
5
 Japan and the U.S. have the largest number of banks in our sample, with 
17.0% and 9.4% of the total number of banks, respectively.  
Data on the expected default frequencies (EDF) are from Moody’s KMV. When 
merging our balance sheet information with the risk measures, the number of banks in 
our sample falls to slightly less than 250 banks, depending on the measure of risk that 
we used. 
4.2. Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables in 
our empirical model. Our two measures of excess risk exhibit great variability. Also 
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 The 56 countries in our sample are the following: Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Rep. of Korea, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, 
and Venezuela. 
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geographic reach shows substantial variability. The more geographically diversified 
commercial banks in our sample exhibit a geographic reach in excess of 0.75. 
Examples of these banks include ABN Amro (Netherlands), BNP Paribas (France), 
Société Générale (France), Citibank (U.S.) and the HSBC (U.K.). Purely domestic 
banks, that have no foreign subsidiaries, include instead 1st Source Bank (U.S.), 
Citizens Bank (U.S.), City National Bank (U.S.), Banca Italalease (Italy), Canadian 
Western Bank (Canada), Howa Bank (Japan), and Daishi Bank (Japan). When 
measuring geographic diversification in terms of geographic share (i.e., the weight of 
foreign subsidiaries’ assets in subsidiaries’ total assets), the most geographically 
dispersed banks are Deutsche Bank (Germany), Unicredit (Italy) and the Royal Bank of 
Scotland (U.K.). According to the modified Hirsch-Hirfindhal Index of bank 
geographic concentration, the most diversified banks are BBVA (Spain), ING 
(Netherlands) and the National Bank (Greece). Our sample shows high variability also 
in terms of bank size: BNP Paribas (France), Deutsche Bank (Germany), HSBC (U.K.), 
ING (The Netherlands), Santander (Spain) and UBS (Switzerland), the largest banks in 
terms of total assets, are about two order of magnitudes larger than small financial 
intermediaries such as Citizens Bank, Sunwest Bank, First California Bank (U.S.) and 
Howa Bank (Japan).  
Table 2 presents the mean and median differences of the excess risk values of 
domestically and internationally oriented banks, where we define a bank as 
geographically diversified if it has a value of the diversity index above 0.7 and as 
domestically oriented if it has a value below 0.3. In the first row of Table 2, we test the 
null hypothesis that the mean excess risk values for internationally and domestically 
oriented banks are the same. The values of the statistics of the t-test do not allow us to 
reject the hypothesis of equality of means. Because the distribution of excess risk is 
mostly skewed to the right, we present in the second row of Table 2 the results of a 
non-parametric test for the differences in the medians. In this case, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis of equality of medians for excess Z-score, but excess EDF yields a 
significant statistic. However, since sample statistics do not fully explain the 
relationship between bank risk and diversification, we move next to a finer-grained 
analysis, based on a set of multivariate econometric models. 
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5. Econometric analysis 
5.1. Baseline specification 
Table 3 reports the baseline results of the estimation of of equation (1), where we 
include country and year fixed effects in all specifications, and the measures of excess 
risk are trimmed at the 5% and 95% percentiles.
6
 
 Panels 1-3 of Table 3 report the estimates using the excess EDF as a measure of 
bank risk and geographic reach as the measure of diversification. Panels 4-6 have the 
same setup, but present the results obtained measuring excess risk with the Z’-score. 
Our first estimates are based on OLS (Panels 1 and 4). However, to account for the 
presence of influential observations and for the non-normality of the dependent 
variable, we also estimate a robust regression (Panels 2 and 5) and a quantile regression 
model evaluated at the median (Panels 3 and 6), with standard errors bootstrapped with 
100 replications (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). In both cases, we adopt the same 
specification used in the OLS estimates.  
In Panels 1-3, the coefficient of geographic reach is positive, it ranges from 
0.546 to 0.636, and it is always significantly different from zero at the 1% level. This 
finding indicates that there exists a positive, statistically and economically significant 
relationship between geographic diversification and bank risk: geographically 
diversified banks have a significantly higher probability of default than similar banks 
with geographically focused activities. Measuring risk using Z’-score, a backward-
looking and balance-sheet-based measure, gives similar results (Panels 4-6). The 
coefficient of geographic reach ranges from 6.396 to 7.549 and it is once again 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding provides further support for the 
previous evidence.  
The coefficients of the other control variables provide additional insights into the 
determinants of bank risk. Measured by the logarithm of its total assets, bank size has a 
negative and significant impact on the expected default frequency. This result suggests 
that larger banks have more opportunities for risk diversification, and that they can 
benefit from safety nets which influence their ability to weather adverse financial 
difficulties as compared to smaller financial institutions. In contrast, the statistically 
insignificant coefficient of the logarithm of total  income shows that, for given total of 
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 In unreported regressions, available upon request, we verified that including the more extreme valules, 
the results are even starker than those of Table 3. 
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assets, banks with larger revenues are equally exposed to the probability of default. 
Banks with a higher franchise value, which we proxy with the level of returns on assets, 
also have a lower probability of default, consistent with the view that they are less 
prone to take on risky activities. The incidence of deposits on total liabilities has an 
unclear effect on bank risk, but its inclusion does not alter the key findings on bank 
international diversification. On the contrary, more capitalized banks are less prone to 
default, as the coefficient estimate of equity to assets is negative and statistically 
significant in all specifications. 
The overall picture emerging from our baseline specification clearly shows that 
internationally diversified banks with broader geographic footprints are riskier than 
their peers. In the following, we present the results of a number of additional 
regressions that test the robustness of our findings. 
5.2. Non-linear effects  
Gulamhussen et al. (2010) show that geographic diversification has an inverse U-
shaped effect on bank value. In other words, if a bank is operating in a small number of 
countries, then international diversification causes the bank’s value to increase, but 
once the bank reaches a given threshold, further expansion abroad has instead a 
negative effect. In that paper, we argued that this finding might be due to the high costs 
and the excessive complexity of managing large multinational banks. One possible 
reason is that the management of very large multinational banks might entail 
considerable risks. If this were the case, we should find that very large banks have a 
higher degree of riskiness than what is expected based on the linear relationship 
estimated above. 
To test this hypothesis, we re-estimate the baseline specification substituting our 
continuous measure of geographic reach with 6 dummies: one for the values of 
geographic reach that are equal to zero and the other 5 for each quintile of the strictly 
positive support of the distribution of geographic reach. Panels 1 and 4 of Table 4 
report the results for our two different measures of risk. The key finding is that the 
relationship between international diversification and bank risk increases with the level 
of diversification. This is consistent with the hypothesis that high levels of international 
diversification entail substantial agency costs and management complexity, which 
hinder corporate control, increase the banks’ opaqueness and, ultimately, augment their 
riskiness. In particular, when we measure risk using excess EDF, only the coefficients 
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of the dummies for the most geographically diversified banks are statistically 
significant (i.e., a value of geographic reach above 0.12, indicating a presence in 12% 
of the foreign countries in which the most diversified bank of the sample has 
subsidiaries). In the case of the Z’-score, the evidence of a non-linear relationship is 
also confirmed, since the largest coefficients are those of the dummies for the higher 
quintiles. In all specifications, the coefficients of the other bank-specific controls are in 
line with the baseline findings.  
An additional nonlinearity could be instead related to the level of bank risk. For 
example, less risky banks might find it beneficial to diversify their activities 
internationally, reducing their overall riskiness, while for riskier banks agency 
problems might be more pervasive, leading to a positive relationship between 
international diversification and bank risk. To verify this additional hypothesis, we 
have estimated an interquantile regression, testing whether the effect of geographic 
diversification is different at the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles of the distribution of our 
measures of risk. The results, presented in Panels 2 and 4 of Table 4, show that the 
coefficients of the measures of geographic diversification are never statistically 
significant, suggesting that the effect of international diversification is the same at 
different levels of bank risk.
7
 
5.3.  Alternative measures of geographic diversification 
Table 5 presents the results obtained estimating our empirical model with the two 
alternative measures of geographic diversification described in Section 3: geographic 
share (equation (4)) and geographic concentration (equation (5)). Measuring 
diversification with geographic share (i.e., a function of the share of the foreign 
subsidiaries’ assets over the total value of bank assets), we find a positive but 
statistically insignificant relationship with excess EDF, and a positive and statistically 
significant relationship at the 1% level with excess Z’-score. This result suggests that 
the dispersion across a large number of foreign countries has a stronger impact on 
riskiness than the sheer incidence of foreign activities. When we measure 
diversification using geographic concentration (HHI), which weighs the number of 
foreign countries in which a bank is present by the size of the foreign activities, the 
estimated coefficient is indeed positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for 
                                                 
7
 In unreported regressions, available upon request, we have found similar results comparing the effect at 
the 10th and 90th percentiles. 
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both risk measures, providing further support to the argument that it is dispersion that 
entails more risk. 
5.4. Additional robustness checks 
In addition to the two risk measures described above, as a further robustness check we 
also estimated our empirical model using the excess variability of bank stock returns, a 
market based and backward looking measure. We collected data from 1999 to 2007 on 
a weekly basis from Bloomberg, and computed the average standard deviation of stock 
market returns for three rolling years. Table 6 presents the results of regressing 
alternatively our three measures of geographic diversification on excess earnings 
volatility. Excluding the case of geographic share, the results confirm the previous 
findings of a positive relationship between international diversification and risk. 
In a number of additional regressions, that we do not report for space reasons but 
are available upon request, we performed some further robustness checks. First, we 
used CDS spreads as a forward-looking measure of bank risk.
8
 We obtained our data 
from Markit, a commercial data provider (see also Jorion and Zhang, 2007). 
Unfortunately, merging our data set with this additional information we ended up with 
a sample of only 75 banks.
9
 Reassuringly, also in this case we found a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between internationalization and risk. Second, we 
calculated our measures of excess risk using the average value of banks with a diversity 
index above 90% for internationally oriented banks, and the average value of banks 
with a value below 10% for domestically oriented banks. The results are also in this 
case qualitatively unchanged. Finally, we excluded in turn the U.S. and Japan, because 
these two countries represent 9.4% and 17.0% of our sample, respectively. Once again, 
our previous results remain economically and statistically unchanged.  
5.5. Endogeneity 
In the previous Sections we have been rather careful in presenting our results as partial 
correlations, avoiding to stress the existence of a causal relationship of international 
                                                 
8
 CDS are contracts that provide insurance against the risk of default of a financial asset in which an 
insurance buyer pays the insurer a fixed amount (i.e., a defined CDS premium) at regular time intervals 
until the end of the contract or until the default event occurs. In the event of default, the insurer refunds 
the CDS holder for the nominal value of the defaulted asset. 
9
 Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (2010) face a similar problem of lack of data on CDS spreads when they analyzed 
the link between bank risk and capital, ending up with a sample of only 33 internationally active banks. 
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diversification on bank risk. Indeed, many determinants of geographic diversification 
are the same that underpin bank risk. Finding that more diversified banks are exposed 
to higher levels of risk does not therefore constitute sufficient proof per se of a 
causality effect. Indeed, international diversification itself may be an endogenous 
choice, and commercial banks that decide to pursue riskier business models may decide 
to do so also by diversifying their activities across national borders. 
To uncover the existence of a causal relationship from international 
diversification to riskiness, we employ three different estimation techniques. First, we 
re-estimate the baseline specification using bank level fixed effects, therefore 
controlling for all possible omitted bank specific characteristics that might be correlated 
with both geographic diversification and excess risk. Clearly, in this way we immunize 
our model to all the information content of bank cross-section variability. The results of 
Panels 1 and 4 of Table 7 show that the coefficient of geographic diversification is 
positive and statistically significant for both measures of bank risk, confirming our 
previous findings.  
Second, we augment the baseline specification including the lagged dependent 
variable, since our measure of bank value is likely to be time-persistent. We use the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) developed for dynamic panel data model 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995).
10
 Panels 2 and 5 of Table 7 
show that indeed the lagged dependent variable is positive and highly statistically 
significant. Reassuringly, the coefficient of geographic diversification is also in this 
case positive and statistically significant. Moreover, the value of the Hansen statistic for 
over-identifying restrictions, testing the hypothesis of lack of correlation between the 
instruments and residuals, and the value of the test for absence of second-order serial 
correlation of residuals both point to the validity of our specification. 
Finally we use a two stage approach, instrumenting the measure of degree of 
international diversification with: (i) its two most recent lagged values; (ii) the 
geographic distance of the country hosting the parent company from all other countries 
in our sample weighted by each country’s total GDP, an asymmetric measure of the 
vicinity to foreign markets that might be used for geographic diversification; (iii) the 
share of geographically diversified banks in the country, as indirect evidence of an 
environment that favors internationalization; (iv) a dummy variable for banks that are 
                                                 
10
 Estimation is conducted using the XTABOND2 program for Stata written by David Roodman (2006). 
 17 
included in the Standard and Poor’s 500 on the grounds that they might be better 
equipped to finance geographic diversification; (v) an index of regulatory quality 
(Kaufman et al., 2009); and (vi) an index of economic freedom, as proxies of how 
much the institutional environment is favorable to international diversification.
11
 The 
results reported in Panels 3 and 6 of Table 7 show that also in this case the coefficients 
of geographic diversification are positive and statistically significant.  
6. Conclusions 
The design of a new regulatory framework capable of addressing the many fallacies 
uncovered by the recent financial crisis requires a precise understanding of the 
characteristics of the different business models followed by banks and of their 
riskiness. One of the issues that has captured much attention from regulators and 
policymakers is the international dimension of the financial markets, particularly the 
role of multinational players. 
In this paper we show that multinational banks are indeed riskier. The higher 
value entailed by international diversification found by Gulamhussen et al. (2010) 
comes therefore at a cost: multinational banks, especially the largest players that have 
subsidiaries all over the world, have a higher expected probability of default, as 
measured by EDFs, lower Z-scores, and higher stock price earnings volatility. Several 
robustness checks indicate that our findings are not driven by few influential 
observations, or biased by endogeneity problems.  
As there are no grounds to exclude the benefits from the diversification of the 
idiosyncratic shocks to the asset and loan portfolios, we can infer that higher riskiness 
is due to the business model chosen by multinational banks. In particular, it is most 
likely that incentive problems lie at the root of this higher riskiness. Multinational 
banks are not riskier per se, but they can take on more risk if the management decides 
to do so. A regulatory framework that increases the costs of holding cross-border 
activities and participations might have a negative adverse-selection effect such that 
only those who are ready to assume high levels of risk will diversify internationally. As 
recently argued by Diamond and Rajan (2009), a better approach would be to directly 
                                                 
11
 Regulatory quality is from the World Bank data base (Worldwide Governance Indicators, available at 
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance), as in Kaufman et al. (2009); economic freedom is from the 
Heritage Foundation (http://www.heritage.org/Index/), and it is an average of the scores of ten country 
indicators: Business Freedom, Trade Freedom, Fiscal Freedom, Government Spending, Monetary 
Freedom, Investment Freedom, Financial Freedom, Property rights, Freedom from Corruption, Labor 
Freedom. 
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adjust the mechanism behind the incentives that lead multinational banks to take on 
excessive levels of risk. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
Excess value is defined as the difference between the actual risk level of bankj and its adjusted risk, as our proxy for risk. 
Adjusted Riskj = αjt Riskint + (1 - αj) Riskdom, where Riskint is the average Risk level of the banks with international diversification 
levels above the 70% threshold (i.e., highly diversified multinational commercial banks), and Riskdom represents the average 
Risk level of the banks equal to or below the 30% threshold. We computed the excess values of the following risk measures: (i) 
the 5-year expected default frequency (EDF), which proxies the likelihood to default; (ii) a transformed Z-score, which is the 
symmetric value of ) that gauges the proximity to default, where CAR is the capital asset ratio, EQT is 
the equity-to-assets ratio, and σ(ROA) is the volatility of assets; (vi) the earnings volatility, which is computed with a three-
year rolling widow. For bank j, α is the index of geographical dispersion in foreign countries, where αj = nj / nmax, nj is the 
number of foreign countries in which bank j has a subsidiary, and nmax is the maximum number of foreign countries in which 
the most diversified bank has subsidiaries. Geographic diversity is the ratio of nj,t  to nmax,t, where njt  is the number of foreign 
countries in which bank j has a subsidiary in year t, and nmax,t is the maximum number of foreign countries in which the most 
diversified bank has subsidiaries in year t. Two other measures of geographic diversification include the following: the 
geographic dispersion of subsidiaries (geographic share), which is estimated by 1 – [(total subsidiaries assets – foreign 
subsidiaries assets) / (total subsidiaries assets)]; and the subsidiaries concentration, which is proxied by a transformed Hirsch-
Herfindhal index (HHI) (1 – ∑j(subsidiaryj assets/total subsidiaries assets)
2
). The bank controls include the following: (i) the 
logarithm of total assets (log assets); (ii) the logarithm of total operating income (log income); (iii) ROA as a proxy for 
profitability; (iv) access to funding, which is proxied by the ratio of deposits to liabilities; and (v) capitalization which is 
proxied by equity to assets.  
    
 
     
Variable 
Mean 
  
Coefficient 
of variation 
 1st percentile  
99th 
percentile 
 
St. Dev 
Baseline         
excess EDF 0.02  44,00  -0.60  3.74  
 0.88        
   
 
     
excess Z-score -0.20  -16,90  -5.46  11.62  
 3.38        
   
 
     
excess earnings volatility (rolling window) 0.01  86.00  -0.39  4.12  
 0.86        
   
 
     
geographic reach (n/nmax) 0.07  2,29  0.00  0.81  
 0.16        
   
 
     
geographic share 0.17  1,82  0.00  1.00  
 0.31        
   
 
     
geographic concentration (HHI) 0.17  1,47  0.00  0.80  
 0.25        
   
 
     
assets 1,511.52  1.14  171.01  9,119.74  
 1,722.22        
   
 
     
income 247.25  1.03  24.11  1,347.15  
 254.41        
   
 
     
ROA 1.04  1,37  -2.87  5.08  
 1.42        
   
 
     
deposits to liabilities 0.88  0,18  0.18  1.00  
 0.16        
         
equity to assets 0.09  0,67  0.01  0.32  
 0.06        
         
 
   ROAEQTCAR 
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Table 2  
Excess risk for diversified banks 
Excess risk is defined as the difference between the actual risk level of bank and its adjusted risk level: Adjusted Riskj = αjt Riskint + (1 - αj) Riskdom, where Riskint 
is the average Risk level of the banks with international diversification levels above the 70% threshold (i.e., highly diversified multinational commercial banks), 
and Riskdom represents the average Risk level of the banks equal to or below the 30% threshold. We computed the excess values of the following risk measures: 
(i) the 5-year expected default frequency (EDF), which proxies the likelihood to default; (ii) a transformed Z-score, which is equal to the symmetric value of  
 that gauges the proximity to default, where CAR is the capital asset ratio, EQT is the equity-to-assets ratio, and σ(ROA) is the volatility 
of assets. We trimmed excess risk at the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
 
 
excess 
EDF 
excess  
Z’-score 
  Estim. 
Test for  
differences 
Estim. 
Test for  
differences 
Mean excess value  
(t-statistic for mean differences) 
       
 Diversified Banks -0.049 0.075  -0.726 0.534  
 Non-diversified banks 0.026 (-0.423)  -0.191 (-0.754)  
        
Median excess value  
(p-value for median differences) 
     
 Diversified banks -0.085 25.489 *** -2.519 2.153  
 Non-diversified banks -0.217 (0.000)  -0.849 (-0.142)  
        
        
 
   ROAEQTCAR 
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Table 3 
Geographic reach and bank risk – baseline specification 
Dependent variables are Excess EDF and Excess Z’-score. Excess values are defined as the difference between the actual risk level of bankj and its adjusted risk: 
Adjusted Riskj = αjt Riskint + (1 - αj) Riskdom, where Riskint is the average Risk level of the banks with international diversification levels above the 70% threshold 
(i.e., highly diversified multinational commercial banks), and Riskdom represents the average Risk level of the banks equal to or below the 30% threshold. We 
computed the excess values of the following risk measures: (i) the 5-year expected default frequency (EDF), which proxies the likelihood to default; (ii) a 
transformed Z-score, which is the symmetric value of ) that gauges the proximity to default, where CAR is the capital asset ratio, EQT is 
the equity-to-assets ratio, and σ(ROA) is the volatility of assets. For bank j, α is the index of geographical dispersion in foreign countries, where αj = nj / nmax, nj is 
the number of foreign countries in which bank j has a subsidiary, and nmax is the maximum number of foreign countries in which the most diversified bank has 
subsidiaries. Geographic reach is the ratio of nj,t  to nmax,t, where njt  is the number of foreign countries in which bank j has a subsidiary in year t, and nmax,t is the 
maximum number of foreign countries in which the most diversified bank has subsidiaries in year t. The bank controls include the following: (i) the logarithm of 
total assets (log assets); (ii) the logarithm of total operating income (log income); (iii) ROA as a proxy for profitability; (iv) access to funding, which is proxied by 
the ratio of deposits to liabilities; and (v) capitalization which is proxied by equity to assets. We included but do not report the country and year fixed effects. We 
trimmed excess risk at the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles. The p-values are in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Excess EDF Excess Z’-score 
 
OLS reg. Robust reg. Median reg. OLS reg. Robust reg. Median reg. 
             
geographic reach 0.546 *** 0.636 *** 0.604 *** 6.396 *** 7.136  *** 7.549 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
log of assets -0.120 *** -0.101 *** -0.086 *** -1.025 *** -0.530 *** -1.092 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.009)  (0.000)  (0.007)  (0.000)  
log of income -0.001  -0.023  -0.017  0.228  0.217  0.228  
 (0.964)  (0.244)  (0.550)  (0.293)  (0.142)  (0.111)  
ROA -0.055 *** -0.057 *** -0.069 *** -1.300 *** -1.400 *** -0.960 *** 
 (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.006)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
deposits to liabilities 0.065  0.229 *** 0.139  1.066  -1.116 ** 0.735  
 (0.450)  (0.000)  (0.102)  (0.147)  (0.026)  (0.260)  
equity to assets -0.654 * -2.650 *** -1.148  -12.130 *** -9.092 *** -3.167  
 (0.099)  (0.000)  (0.181)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.245)  
             
Country effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 1,033  1,033  1,033  940  940  1,283  
   ROAEQTCAR 
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Table 4 
Geographic reach and bank risk – non-linear effects 
Dependent variables are Excess EDF and Excess Z’-score. Excess values are defined as the difference between the actual risk 
level of bankj and its adjusted risk: Adjusted Riskj = αjt Riskint + (1 - αj) Riskdom, where Riskint is the average Risk level of the 
banks with international diversification levels above the 70% threshold (i.e., highly diversified multinational commercial 
banks), and Riskdom represents the average Risk level of the banks equal to or below the 30% threshold. We computed the 
excess values of the following risk measures: (i) the 5-year expected default frequency (EDF), which proxies the likelihood 
to default; (ii) a transformed Z-score, which is the symmetric value of ) that gauges the proximity to 
default, where CAR is the capital asset ratio, EQT is the equity-to-assets ratio, and σ(ROA) is the volatility of assets. For 
bank j, α is the index of geographical dispersion in foreign countries, where αj = nj / nmax, nj is the number of foreign 
countries in which bank j has a subsidiary, and nmax is the maximum number of foreign countries in which the most 
diversified bank has subsidiaries. Geographic reach is the ratio of nj,t  to nmax,t, where njt  is the number of foreign countries in 
which bank j has a subsidiary in year t, and nmax,t is the maximum number of foreign countries in which the most diversified 
bank has subsidiaries in year t. The bank controls include the following: (i) the logarithm of total assets (log assets); (ii) the 
logarithm of total operating income (log income); (iii) ROA as a proxy for profitability; (iv) access to funding, which is 
proxied by the ratio of deposits to liabilities; and (v) capitalization which is proxied by equity to assets. Estimation is with 
robust regression techniques. We included but do not report the country and year fixed effects. We trimmed excess risk at the 
5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles. The p-values are in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, 
and *, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Excess EDF Excess Z’-score 
 
Splitting geographic 
 reach 
Interquantile  
reg. 
Splitting geographic  
reach 
Interquantile  
reg. 
         
geographic reach   -0.013    -0.505  
   (0.876)    (0.747)  
geographic reach – Geon2 0.035    0.754 ***    
 (0.228)    (0.000)    
geographic reach – Geon3 0.036    0.479 *   
 (0.350)    (0.065)    
geographic reach – Geon4 0.024    0.822 ***   
 (0.520)    (0.001)    
geographic reach – Geon5 0.122 ***   1.383 ***   
 (0.002)    (0.000)    
geographic reach – Geon6 0.387 ***   4.271 ***   
 (0.000)    (0000)    
log of assets -0.111 *** -0.094  -0.846 *** 0.485  
 (0.000)  (0.118)  (0.000)  (0.241)  
log of income -0.024  0.011 *** 0.236  -0.190  
 (0.256)  (0.836)  (0.112)  (0.429)  
ROA -0.043 *** -0.003  -1.086 *** -0.462 ** 
 (0.007)  (0.935)  (0.000)  (0.039)  
deposits to liabilities 0.149 ** -0.279 * -0.884 * 1.740  
 (0.038)  (0.086)  (0.079)  (0.257)  
equity to assets -2.606 *** -0.559  -7.081  1.260  
 (0.000)  (0.539)  (0.018) ** (0.804)  
         
Country effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 940  1,033  855  1,283  
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Table 5 
Geographic reach and bank risk – alternative measures of geographic diversification 
Dependent variables are Excess EDF and Excess Z’-score. Excess values are defined as the difference between the actual risk 
level of bankj and its adjusted risk: Adjusted Riskj = αjt Riskint + (1 - αj) Riskdom, where Riskint is the average Risk level of the 
banks with international diversification levels above the 70% threshold (i.e., highly diversified multinational commercial 
banks), and Riskdom represents the average Risk level of the banks equal to or below the 30% threshold. We computed the 
excess values of the following risk measures: (i) the 5-year expected default frequency (EDF), which proxies the likelihood 
to default; (ii) a transformed Z-score, which is the symmetric value of ) that gauges the proximity to 
default, where CAR is the capital asset ratio, EQT is the equity-to-assets ratio, and σ(ROA) is the volatility of assets. For 
bank j, α is the index of geographical dispersion in foreign countries, where αj = nj / nmax, nj is the number of foreign 
countries in which bank j has a subsidiary, and nmax is the maximum number of foreign countries in which the most 
diversified bank has subsidiaries. The alternative measures of geographic diversification include the following: (i) the 
subsidiaries concentration, which is proxied by a transformed Hirsch-Herfindhal index (HHI) (1 – ∑j(subsidiaryj assets/total 
subsidiaries assets)
2
); and (ii) the geographic dispersion of subsidiaries (geographic share), which is estimated by 1 – [(total 
subsidiaries assets – foreign subsidiaries assets) / (total subsidiaries assets)]. The bank controls include the following: (i) the 
logarithm of total assets (log assets); (ii) the logarithm of total operating income (log income); (iii) ROA as a proxy for 
profitability; (iv) access to funding, which is proxied by the ratio of deposits to liabilities; and (v) capitalization which is 
proxied by equity to assets. Estimation is with robust regression techniques. We included but do not report the country and 
year fixed effects. We trimmed excess risk at the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles. The p-values are in parentheses. Significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Excess EDF Excess Z’-score 
         
geographic share   0.012    0.965 *** 
   (0.764)    (0.000)  
geographic concentration  0.143 **   2.417 ***   
 (0.011)    (0.000)    
log of assets -0.017  -0.020  -0.777 *** -0.694 *** 
 (0.610)  (0.545)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
log of income -0.033  -0.028  0.293 * 0.352 ** 
 (0.206)  (0.268)  (0.080)  (0.023)  
ROA -0.045 ** -0.073 *** -1.209 *** -1.254 *** 
 (0.028)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
deposits to liabilities 0.067  0.027  -0.377  0.323  
 (0.404)  (0.743)  (0.451)  (0.506)  
equity to assets -1.128 * -1.320  -10.598 *** -13.845 *** 
 (0.052)  (0.180)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
         
Country effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 607  677  671  751  
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Table 6 
Geographic reach and bank risk – earnings volatility 
Dependent variables is the Excess earnings volatility. Excess values are defined as the difference between the actual risk 
level of bankj and its adjusted risk: Adjusted Risk = αj Risk1 + (1 - αj) Risk2, where Risk1 is the average Risk level of the banks 
with international diversification levels above the 70% threshold (i.e., highly diversified multinational commercial banks), 
and Risk2 represents the average Risk level of the banks equal to or below the 30% threshold. We computed the excess value 
of the following risk measure: (i) the earnings volatility, which is computed with a three-year rolling widow. For bank j, α is 
the index of geographical dispersion in foreign countries, where αj = nj / nmax, nj is the number of foreign countries in which 
bank j has a subsidiary, and nmax is the maximum number of foreign countries in which the most diversified bank has 
subsidiaries. Geographic reach is the ratio of nj,t  to nmax,t, where njt  is the number of foreign countries in which bank j has a 
subsidiary in year t, and nmax,t is the maximum number of foreign countries in which the most diversified bank has 
subsidiaries in year t. The alternative measures of geographic diversification include the following: (i) the subsidiaries 
concentration, which is proxied by a transformed Hirsch-Herfindhal index (HHI) (1 – ∑j(subsidiaryj assets/total subsidiaries 
assets)
2
); and (ii) the geographic dispersion of subsidiaries (geographic share), which is estimated by 1 – [(total subsidiaries 
assets – foreign subsidiaries assets) / (total subsidiaries assets)]. The bank controls include the following: (i) the logarithm of 
total assets (log assets); (ii) the logarithm of total operating income (log income); (iii) ROA as a proxy for profitability; (iv) 
access to funding, which is proxied by the ratio of deposits to liabilities; and (v) capitalization which is proxied by equity to 
assets. Estimation is with robust regression techniques. We included but do not report the country and year fixed effects. We 
trimmed excess risk at the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles. The p-values are in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Earnings volatility 
       
geographic reach 0.279 ***     
 (0.000)      
HHI   0.065 ***   
   (0.001)    
geographic share     0.010  
     (0.484)  
log of assets 0.012  0.033 ** 0.022  
 (0.257)  (0.034)  (0.114)  
log of income -0.036 *** -0.045 *** -0.035 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  
ROA -0.001  -0.014 * -0.020 *** 
 (0.766)  (0.069)  (0.008)  
deposits to liabilities 0.008  -0.038  0.037  
 (0.789)  (0.308)  (0.310)  
equity to assets -0.055  0.385 * -0.001  
 (0.409)  (0.068)  (0.997)  
       
Country effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 864  441  484  
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Table 7 
Robustness test of the impact of geographic reach on bank risk: controlling for endogeneity 
Dependent variables are Excess EDF and Excess Z’-score. Excess values are defined as the difference between the actual risk level of bankj and its adjusted risk: 
Adjusted Risk = αj Risk1 + (1 - αj) Risk2, where Risk1 is the average Risk level of the banks with international diversification levels above the 70% threshold (i.e., 
highly diversified multinational commercial banks), and Risk2 represents the average Risk level of the banks equal to or below the 30% threshold. We computed 
the excess values of the following risk measures: (i) the 5-year expected default frequency (EDF), which proxies the likelihood to default; (ii) a transformed Z-
score, which is the symmetric value of ) that gauges the proximity to default, where CAR is the capital asset ratio, EQT is the equity-to-
assets ratio, and σ(ROA) is the volatility of assets. For bank j, α is the index of geographical dispersion in foreign countries, where αj = nj / nmax, nj is the number 
of foreign countries in which bank j has a subsidiary, and nmax is the maximum number of foreign countries in which the most diversified bank has subsidiaries. 
Geographic reach is the ratio of nj,t  to nmax,t, where njt  is the number of foreign countries in which bank j has a subsidiary in year t, and nmax,t is the maximum 
number of foreign countries in which the most diversified bank has subsidiaries in year t. The bank controls include the following: (i) the logarithm of total assets 
(log assets); (ii) the logarithm of total operating income (log income); (iii) ROA as a proxy for profitability; (iv) access to funding, which is proxied by the ratio 
of deposits to liabilities; and (v) capitalization which is proxied by equity to assets. We included but do not report the country and year fixed effects. We trimmed 
excess risk at the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles. The p-values are in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Excess EDF Excess Z’-score 
 Fixed effects Dynamic GMM IV Fixed effects Dynamic GMM IV 
             
lagged excess EDF    0.681 ***         
   (0.000)          
lagged excess Z’-score          0.877 ***   
         (0.000)    
geographic reach 0.499 *** 0.241 ** 3.261 *** 0.587 *** 0.953 * 5.867 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.026)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.068)  (0.000)  
log of assets -0.312  -0.006  0.793 *** -0.096 * -0.222 ** -1.480 *** 
 (0.136)  (0.843)  (0.002)  (0.068)  (0.048)  (0.000)  
log of income -0.057  -0.020  -0.607 ** -0.045  0.094  0.343 * 
 (0.347)  (0.416)  (0.014)  (0.335)  (0.333)  (0.072)  
ROA -0.089 *** -0.054 *** -0.739 *** -0.033  -0.371 *** -0.673 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.394)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
deposits to liabilities 0.282 *** -0.289  -0.780 *** -0.033  -0.198  0.474  
 (0.009)  (0.131)  (0.002)  (0.794)  (0.739)  (0.585)  
equity to assets -1.820  0.025  -9.291 *** -1.520  3.107 * -14.300 *** 
 (0.216)  (0.960)  (0.010)  (0.139)  (0.100)  (0.000)  
             
Country effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 956  757  1,168  583  925  678  
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